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Abstract—Bias-resistant public randomness is a critical com-
ponent in many (distributed) protocols. Generating public ran-
domness is hard, however, because active adversaries may behave
dishonestly to bias public random choices toward their advan-
tage. Existing solutions do not scale to hundreds or thousands
of participants, as is needed in many decentralized systems.
We propose two large-scale distributed protocols, RandHound
and RandHerd, which provide publicly-verifiable, unpredictable,
and unbiasable randomness against Byzantine adversaries. Rand-
Hound relies on an untrusted client to divide a set of randomness
servers into groups for scalability, and it depends on the pigeon-
hole principle to ensure output integrity, even for non-random,
adversarial group choices. RandHerd implements an efficient,
decentralized randomness beacon. RandHerd is structurally
similar to a BFT protocol, but uses RandHound in a one-time
setup to arrange participants into verifiably unbiased random
secret-sharing groups, which then repeatedly produce random
output at predefined intervals. Our prototype demonstrates that
RandHound and RandHerd achieve good performance across
hundreds of participants while retaining a low failure probability
by properly selecting protocol parameters, such as a group size
and secret-sharing threshold. For example, when sharding 512
nodes into groups of 32, our experiments show that RandHound
can produce fresh random output after 240 seconds. RandHerd,
after a setup phase of 260 seconds, is able to generate fresh
random output in intervals of approximately 6 seconds. For this
configuration, both protocols operate at a failure probability of
at most 0.08% against a Byzantine adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
A reliable source of randomness that provides high-entropy
output is a critical component in many protocols [11], [22].
The reliability of the source, however, is often not the only
criterion that matters. In many high-stakes protocols, the
unbiasability and public-verifiability of the randomness gen-
eration process are as important as ensuring that the produced
randomness is good in terms of the entropy it provides [31].
More concretely, Tor hidden services [25] depend on the
generation of a fresh random value each day for protection
against popularity estimations and DoS attacks [34]. Anytrust-
based systems, such as Herbivore [32], Dissent [60], and
Vuvuzela [59], as well as sharded blockchains [23], use bias-
resistant public randomness for scalability by sharding par-
ticipants into smaller groups. TorPath [30] critically depends
on public randomness for setting up consensus groups. Public
randomness can be used to transparently select parameters for
cryptographic protocols or standards, such as in the generation
of elliptic curves [2], [40], where adversaries should not be
able to steer the process to select curves with weak security
parameters [6]. Other use-cases for public randomness include
voting systems [1] for sampling ballots for manual recounts,
lotteries for choosing winning numbers, and Byzantine agree-
ment algorithms [15], [46] for achieving scalability.
The process of generating public randomness is nontrivial,
because obtaining access to sources of good randomness,
even in terms of entropy alone, is often difficult and error-
prone [19], [36]. One approach is to rely on randomness
beacons, which were introduced by Rabin [49] in the context
of contract signing, where a trusted third party regularly emits
randomly chosen integers to the public. The NIST beacon [45]
provides hardware-generated random output from quantum-
mechanical effects, but it requires trust in their centralized
beacon—a problematic assumption, especially after the Dual
EC DRBG debacle [8], [54].
This work is concerned primarily with the trustworthi-
ness, rather than the entropy, of public randomness sources.
Generating public randomness without a trusted party is
often desirable, especially in decentralized settings such as
blockchains, where many mutually-distrustful users may wish
to participate. Producing and using randomness in a distributed
setting presents many issues and challenges, however, such
as how to choose a subset of available beacons, or how
to combine random outputs from multiple beacons without
permitting bias by an active adversary. Prior approaches to
randomness without trusted parties [48] employ Bitcoin [4],
[13], slow cryptographic hash functions [40], lotteries [2], or
financial data [21] as sources for public randomness.
Our goal is to provide bias-resistant public randomness in
the familiar (t, n)-threshold security model already widely-
used both in threshold cryptography [24], [47] and Byzantine
consensus protocols [15]. Generating public randomness is
hard, however, as active adversaries can behave dishonestly in
order to bias public random choices toward their advantage,
e.g., by manipulating their own explicit inputs or by selectively
injecting failures. Although addressing those issues is rela-
tively straightforward for small values of n ≈ 10 [15], [38],
we address scalability challenges of using larger values of n,
in the hundreds or thousands, for enhanced security in real-
world scenarios. For example, scalable randomness is relevant
for public cryptocurrencies [39], [44] which tend to have
hundreds to thousands of distinct miners or for countries with
thousands of national banks that might want to form a national
permissioned blockchain with secure random sharding.
This paper’s contributions are mainly pragmatic rather than
theoretical, building on existing cryptographic primitives to
produce more scalable and efficient distributed randomness
protocols. We introduce two scalable public-randomness gen-
eration protocols: RandHound is a “one-shot” protocol to gen-
erate a single random output on demand, while RandHerd is a
randomness beacon protocol that produces a regular series of
random outputs. Both protocols provide the same key security
properties of unbiasability, unpredictability, availability, and
third-party verifiability of their random outputs.
RandHound is a client-server randomness scavenging pro-
tocol enabling a client to gather fresh randomness on demand
from a potentially large set of nearly-stateless randomness
servers, preferably run by independent parties. A party that
occasionally requires trustworthy public randomness, such as
a lottery association, can use RandHound to produce a random
output that includes contributions of – and trustworthiness
attestations from – all participating servers. The RandHound
client (e.g., the lottery association) first publicly commits to
the parameters of a unique RandHound protocol run, such
as the time and date of the lottery and the set of servers
involved, so a malicious client cannot bias the result by
secretly rerunning the protocol. The client then splits the
servers into balanced subgroups for scalability. Each subgroup
uses publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) [52], [56]
to produce secret inputs such that an honest threshold of
participants can later recover them and form a third-party-
verifiable proof of their validity. To tolerate server failures,
the client selects a subset of secret inputs from each group.
Application of the pidgeonhole principle ensures ensures the
integrity of RandHound’s final output even if some subgroups
are compromised, e.g., due to biased grouping. The client
commits to his choice of secrets, to prevent equivocation,
by obtaining a collective signature [58] from participating
servers. After the servers release the selected secrets, the client
combines and publishes the collective random output along
with a third-party verifiable transcript of the protocol run.
Anyone can subsequently check this transcript to verify that
the random output is trustworthy and unbiased, provided not
too many servers were compromised.
RandHerd is a complementary protocol enabling a poten-
tially large collection of servers to form a distributed public
randomness beacon, which proactively generates a regular
series of public random outputs. RandHerd runs continually
and need not be initiated by any client, but requires stateful
servers. No single or sub-threshold group of failing or mali-
cious servers can halt the protocol, or predict or significantly
bias its output. Clients can check the trustworthiness of any
published beacon output with a single, efficient check of one
collective signature [58]. RandHerd first invokes RandHound
once, at setup or reconfiguration time, to divide the set
of servers securely into uniformly random groups, and to
generate a short-term aggregate public key used to produce
and verify individual beacon outputs. RandHerd subsequently
uses a threshold collective signing protocol based on Shamir
secret sharing [9], [53], to generate random outputs at regular
intervals. Each of RandHerd’s random outputs doubles as
a collective Schnorr signature [57], [58], which clients can
validate efficiently against the group’s aggregate public key.
The dominant cost in both protocols is publicly verifiable
secret sharing (PVSS), which normally incurs O(n3) com-
munication and computation costs on each of n participants.
RandHound and RandHerd run PVSS only among smaller
groups, however, whose configured size c serves as a security
parameter. RandHound therefore reduces asymptotic cost to
O(n) if c is constant. By leveraging efficient tree-structured
communication, RandHerd further reduces the cost of produc-
ing successive beacon outputs to O(log n) per server.
We implemented the RandHound and RandHerd protocols
in Go, and made these implementations freely available as part
of the EPFL DEDIS lab’s Cothority framework.1 Experiments
with our prototype implementations show that, among a collec-
tive of 512 globally-distributed servers divided into groups of
32, RandHerd can produce a new 32-byte collective random
output every 6 seconds, following a one-time setup process
using RandHound that takes approximately 260 seconds. The
randomness verification overhead of RandHerd is equivalent
to verifying a single Schnorr multisignature [51], typically
less than 100 bytes in size, which clients can check in
constant time. Using RandHound alone to produce a random
output on demand, it takes approximately 240 seconds to
produce randomness and approximately 76 seconds to verify it
using the produced 4MByte transcript. In this configuration, a
Byzantine adversary can compromise the availability of either
protocol with a probability of at most 0.08%.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II explores
background and motivation for public randomness. Sections III
and IV introduces the design and security properties of Rand-
Hound and RandHerd, respectively. Section V evaluates the
prototype implementations of both protocols. Finally, Sec-
tion VI summarizes related work and Section VII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
We first introduce notation and summarize techniques for
secret sharing and Schnorr signing, which RandHound and
RandHerd build on. We then consider a series of strawman
protocols illustrating the key challenges in distributed random-
ness generation of commitment, selective aborts, and malicious
secret shares. We end with RandShare, a protocol that offers
the desired properties, but unlike RandHound and RandHerd
is not third-party verifiable and does not scale well.
For the rest of the work, we denote by G a multiplicatively
written cyclic group of order q with generator G, where the
set of non-identity elements in G is written as G∗. We denote
by (xi)i∈I a vector of length |I| with elements xi, for i ∈ I .
Unless stated otherwise, we denote the private key of a node
i by xi and the corresponding public key by Xi = Gxi .
1https://github.com/dedis/cothority
A. Publicly Verifiable Secret-Sharing
A (t, n)-secret sharing scheme [9], [53] enables an honest
dealer to share a secret s among n trustees such that any
subset of t honest trustees can reconstruct s, whereas any
subset smaller than t learns nothing about s. Verifiable secret-
sharing (VSS) [20], [26], [50] adds protection from a dishonest
dealer who might intentionally produce bad shares and prevent
honest trustees from recovering the same, correct secret.
A publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) [52], [56]
scheme makes it possible for any party to verify secret-shares
without revealing any information about the shares or the
secret. During the share distribution phase, for each trustee
i, the dealer produces an encrypted share Ei(si) along with a
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) [18], [27], [28]
that Ei(si) correctly encrypts a valid share si of s. During the
reconstruction phase, trustees recover s by pooling t properly-
decrypted shares. They then publish s along with all shares
and NIZK proofs that show that the shares were properly
decrypted. PVSS runs in three steps:
1) The dealer chooses a degree t − 1 secret sharing poly-
nomial s(x) =
∑t−1
j=0 ajx
j and creates, for each trustee
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, an encrypted share Ŝi = Xs(i)i of the
shared secret S0 = Gs(0). He also creates commitments
Aj = H
aj , where H 6= G is a generator of G, and
for each share a NIZK encryption consistency proof P̂i.
Afterwards, he publishes Ŝi, P̂i, and Aj .
2) Each trustee i verifies his share Ŝi using P̂i and Aj ,
and, if valid, publishes the decrypted share Si = (Ŝi)x
−1
i
together with a NIZK decryption consistency proof Pi.
3) The dealer checks the validity of Si against Pi, discards
invalid shares and, if there are at least t out of n de-
crypted shares left, recovers the shared secret S0 through
Lagrange interpolation.
B. Schnorr Signature Schemes
RandHound and RandHerd rely on variations of the well-
known Schnorr (multi-)signature schemes [3], [42], [51].
1) Threshold Signing: TSS [57] is a distributed (t, n)-
threshold Schnorr signature scheme. TSS allows any subset
of t signers to produce a valid signature. During setup, all
n trustees use VSS to create a long-term shared secret key
x and a public key X = Gx. To sign a statement S, the n
trustees first use VSS to create a short-term shared secret v
and a commitment V = Gv and then compute the challenge
c = H(V ‖ S). Afterwards, each trustee i uses his shares vi
and xi of v and x, respectively, to create a partial response
ri = vi−cxi. Finally, when t out of n trustees collaborate they
can reconstruct the response r through Lagrange interpolation.
The tuple (c, r) forms a regular Schnorr signature on S, which
can be verified against the public key X .
2) Collective Signing: CoSi [58] enables a set of witness-
ing servers coordinated by a leader to efficiently produce a
collective Schnorr signature (c, r) under an aggregate public
key X̂ =
∏n−1
i=0 Xi. CoSi scales Schnorr multisignatures to
thousands of participants by using aggregation techniques and
communication trees.
A CoSi round runs in four steps over two round-trips
between a leader and his witnesses. To sign a statement
S sent down the communication tree by the leader, each
server i computes a commitment Vi = Gvi and in a bottom-
up process, all commitments are aggregated until the leader
holds the aggregate commit V̂ =
∏n−1
i=0 Vi. Once the leader
computes and multicasts down the tree the collective challenge
c = H(V̂ ‖ S), each server i responds with a partial response
ri = vi − cxi. Lastly, the servers aggregate all responses into
r =
∑n−1
i=0 ri in a final bottom-up process.
C. Insecure Approaches to Public Randomness
For expositional clarity, we now summarize a series of
inadequate strawman designs: (I) a naive, trivially insecure
design, (II) one that uses a commit-then-reveal process to
ensure unpredictability but fails to be unbiasable, and (III) one
that uses secret sharing to ensure unbiasability in an honest-
but-curious setting, but is breakable by malicious participants.
Strawman I. The simplest protocol for producing a random
output r =
⊕n−1
i=0 ri requires each peer i to contribute their
secret input ri under the (false) assumption that a random
input from any honest peer would ensure unbiasability of r.
However, a dishonest peer j can force the output value to be
rˆ by choosing rj = rˆ
⊕
i:i 6=j ri upon seeing all other inputs.
Strawman II. To prevent the above attack, we want to
force each peer to commit to their chosen input before seeing
other inputs by using a simple commit-then-reveal approach.
Although the output becomes unpredictable as it is fixed
during the commitment phase, it is not unbiasable because a
dishonest peer can choose not to reveal his input upon seeing
all other openings of committed inputs. By repeatedly forcing
the protocol to restart, the dishonest peer can obtain output
that is beneficial for him, even though he cannot choose its
exact value. The above scenario shows an important yet subtle
difference between an output that is unbiased when a single,
successful run of the protocol is considered, and an output that
is unbiasable in a more realistic scenario, when the protocol
repeats until some output is produced. An attacker’s ability to
re-toss otherwise-random coins he does not like is central to
the reason peer-to-peer networks that use cryptographic hashes
as participant IDs are vulnerable to clustering attacks [41].
Strawman III. To address this issue, we wish to ensure that
a dishonest peer either cannot force the protocol to abort by
refusing to participate, or cannot benefit from doing so. Using
a (t, n)-secret sharing scheme, we can force the adversary to
commit to his action before knowing which action is favorable
to him. First, all n peers, where at most f are dishonest,
distribute secret shares of their inputs using a t = f + 1
recovery threshold. Only after each peer receives n shares
will they reconstruct their inputs and generate r. The threshold
t = f + 1 prevents a dishonest peer from learning anything
about the output value. Therefore, he must blindly choose to
abort the protocol or to distribute his share. Honest peers can
then complete the protocol even if he stops participating upon
seeing the recovered inputs. Unfortunately, a dishonest peer
can still misbehave by producing bad shares, preventing honest
peers from successfully recovering identical secrets.
D. RandShare: Small-Scale Unbiasable Randomness Protocol
RandShare is an unbiasable randomness protocol that en-
sures unbiasability, unpredictability, and availability, but is
practical only at small scale due to O(n3) communication
overhead. RandShare introduces key concepts that we will re-
use in the more scalable RandHound protocol (Section III).
RandShare extends the approach for distributed key-
generation in a synchronous model of Gennaro et al. [29] by
adopting a point-of-no-return strategy implemented through
the concept of a barrier, a specific point in the protocol exe-
cution after which the protocol always completes successfully,
and by extending it to the asynchronous setting, where the
adversary can break timing assumptions [14], [15].
In RandShare, the protocol output is unknown but fixed as
a function of f+1 inputs. After the barrier point, the protocol
output cannot be changed and all honest peers eventually
output the previously fixed value, regardless of the adversary’s
behavior. In RandShare, we define the barrier at the point
where the first honest member reveals the shares he holds.
We assume a Byzantine adversary and an asynchronous
network where messages are eventually delivered. Let N =
{1, . . . , n} denote the list of peers that participate in Rand-
Share and n = 3f + 1, where f is the number of dishonest
peers. Let t = f + 1 be the VSS threshold. We assume every
peer has a copy of a public key Xj for all j 6= i, and that only
valid, properly-signed messages are accepted.
Each RandShare peer i ∈ N executes the following steps:
1. Share Distribution.
1) Select coefficients aik ∈R Z∗q of a degree t − 1 secret
sharing polynomial si(x) =
∑t−1
k=0 aikx
k. The secret to
be shared is si(0) = ai0.
2) Compute polynomial commitments Aik = Gaik , for all
k ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}, and calculate secret shares si(j) for
all j ∈ N.
3) Securely send si(j) to peer j 6= i and start a Byzantine
agreement (BA) run on si(0), by broadcasting Âi =
(Aik)k∈{0,...,t−1}.
2. Share Verification.
1) Initialize a bit-vector Vi = (vi1, . . . , vin) to zero, to keep
track of valid secrets sj(0) received. Then wait until a
message with share sj(i) from each j 6= i has arrived.
2) Verify that each sj(i) is valid using Âj . This may be
done by checking that Sj(i) = Gsj(i) where:
Sj(x) =
t−1∏
k=0
Ax
k
jk = G
∑t−1
k=0 ajkx
k
= Gsj(x)
3) If verification succeeds, confirm sj(i) by broadcasting the
prepare message (p, i, j, 1) as a positive vote on the BA
instance of sj(0). Otherwise, broadcast (p, i, j, sj(i)) as
a negative vote. This also includes the scenario when Âj
was never received.
4) If there are at least 2f +1 positive votes for secret sj(0),
broadcast (c, i, j, 1) as a positive commitment. If there
are at least f+1 negative votes for secret sj(0), broadcast
(c, i, j, 0) as a negative commitment.
5) If there are at least 2f + 1 commits (c, i, j, x) for secret
sj(0), set vij = x. If x = 1, consider the secret
recoverable else consider secret sj(0) invalid.
3. Share Disclosure.
1) Wait until a decision has been taken for all entries of Vi
and determine the number of 1-entries n′ in Vi.
2) If n′ > f , broadcast for each 1-entry j in Vi the share
sj(i) and abort otherwise.
4. Randomness Recovery.
1) Wait until at least t shares for each j 6= i have arrived,
recover the secret sharing polynomial sj(x) through
Lagrange interpolation, and compute the secret sj(0).
2) Compute and publish the collective random string as:
Z =
n′⊕
j=1
sj(0)
RandShare achieves unbiasability, because the secret shar-
ing threshold t = f + 1 prevents dishonest peers from
recovering the honest peers’ secrets before the barrier. The
Byzantine agreement procedures ensure that all honest peers
have a consistent copy of Vi and therefore know which n′ > f
secrets will be recovered after the barrier or if the protocol run
has already failed as n′ ≤ f . Furthermore, if at least f + 1
honest members sent a success message for each share, and
thus Byzantine agreement (with at least 2f + 1 prepares) has
been achieved on the validity of these shares, each honest
peer will be able to recover every other peer’s secret value.
Unpredictability follows from the fact that the final random
string Z contains n′ ≥ f + 1 secrets; there are at most f
malicious peers, and no honest peer will release his shares
before the barrier. Availability is ensured because f+1 honest
nodes out of the total 2f+1 positive voters are able to recover
the secrets, given the secret-sharing threshold t = f + 1,
without the collaboration of the dishonest nodes.
III. RANDHOUND: SCALABLE, VERIFIABLE
RANDOMNESS SCAVENGING
This section presents RandHound, a scalable client/server
protocol for producing public, verifiable, unbiasable random-
ness. RandHound enables a client, who initiates the protocol,
to “scavenge” public randomness from an arbitrary collection
of servers. RandHound uses a commit-then-reveal approach
to generate randomness, implemented via publicly verifiable
secret sharing (PVSS) [52], and it uses CoSi [58] as a witness-
ing mechanism to fix the protocol output and prevent client
equivocation. We first provide an overview of RandHound and
introduce the notation and threat model. We then describe
randomness generation and verification in detail, analyze the
protocol’s security properties, and discuss protocol extensions.
A. Protocol Overview
RandHound employs a client/server model, in which a client
invokes the services of a set of RandHound servers to produce
a random value. RandHound assumes the same threat model as
RandShare, i.e., that at most f out of at least 3f+1 participants
are dishonest. If the client is honest, we allow at most f
servers to be malicious and if the adversary controls the client
then we allow at most f − 1 malicious servers. We assume
that dishonest participants can send different but correctly
signed messages to honest participants in stages where they are
supposed to broadcast the same message to all. Furthermore,
we assume that the goal of the adversary is to bias or DoS-
attack the protocol run in the honest-client scenario, and to
bias the output in the malicious-client scenario.
We assume the client gets only one attempt to run Rand-
Hound. A dishonest client might try to run the protocol
many times until he obtains a favorable output. However,
each protocol run uses a session configuration file C that
uniquely identifies a protocol run and binds it to the intended
purpose of the random output. To illustrate RandHound’s
deployment model, the client might be a lottery authority,
which must commit ahead of time to all lottery parameters
including the time and date of the lottery. A cryptographic
hash of the configuration parameters in C uniquely identifies
the RandHound protocol instance. If that protocol run fails
to produce an output, this failure triggers an alarm and an
investigation, and not a silent re-run of the protocol.
Honest RandHound servers enforce this “one-shot” rule
by remembering and refusing to participating in a second
protocol run with session configuration C until the time-
window defined by C has passed. This memory of having
recently participated in a session for configuration C is the
only state RandHound servers need to store for significant
time; the servers are otherwise largely stateless.
RandHound improves on RandShare’s lack of scalability
by sharing secrets not directly among all other servers but
only within smaller groups of servers. RandHound servers
share their secrets only with their respective group members,
decreasing the number of shares they create and transmit. This
reduces the communication and computational overhead from
O(n3) to O(nc2), where c is the average (constant) size of
a group. The client arranges the servers into disjoint groups.
The protocol remains secure even if the client chooses a non-
random adversarial grouping, however, because the client must
employ all groups and the pidgeonhole principle ensures that
at least one group is secure.
Each server chooses its random input value and creates
shares only for other members of the same group using PVSS.
The server sends the encrypted shares to the client together
with the NIZK proofs. The client chooses a subset of server
inputs from each group, omitting servers that did not respond
on time or with proper values, thus fixing each group’s secret
and consequently the output of the protocol. After the client
receives a sign-off on his choice of inputs in a global run of
CoSi, the servers decrypt and send their shares to the client.
The client, in turn, combines the recovered group secrets to
produce the final random output Z. The client documents the
run of the protocol in a log L, or transcript, by recording
the messages he sends and receives. The transcript serves as a
third party verifiable proof of the produced randomness. Fig. 1
gives an overview on the RandHound design.
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Fig. 1. An overview of the RandHound design.
B. Description
Let G be a group of large prime order q with generator G.
Let N = {0, . . . , n−1} denote the list of nodes, let S = N\{0}
denote the list of servers and let f be the maximum number of
permitted Byzantine nodes. We require that n = 3f+1. We set
(x0, X0) as the key pair of the client and (xi, Xi) as the one
of server i > 0. Further let Tl ⊂ S, with l ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1},
be pairwise disjoint trustee groups and let tl = b|Tl|/3c + 1
be the secret sharing threshold for group Tl.
The publicly available session configuration is denoted by
C = (X,T, f, u, w), where X = (X0, . . . , Xn−1) is the list
of public keys, T = (T0, . . . , Tm−1) is the server grouping, u
is a purpose string, and w is a timestamp. We call H(C) the
session identifier. The session configuration and consequently
the session identifier have to be unique for each protocol run.
We assume that all nodes know the list of public keys X .
The output of RandHound is a random string Z which is
publicly verifiable through a transcript L.
1) Randomness Generation: RandHound’s randomness-
generation protocol has seven steps and requires three round
trips between the client and the servers; see Figure 2 for an
overview. All exchanged messages are signed by the sending
party, messages from the client to servers include the session
identifier, and messages from servers to the client contain a
reply identifier that is the hash of the previous client message.
We implicitly assume that client and servers always verify
message signatures and session and reply identifiers and that
they mark non-authentic or replayed messages and ignore them
from the rest of the protocol run.
RandHound consists of three inquiry-response phases be-
tween the client and the servers followed by the client’s
randomness recovery.
1) Initialization (Client). The client initializes a protocol
run by executing the following steps:
Client Server iMessages
〈I1〉x0 = 〈H(C), T, u, w〉x0
〈R1i〉xi = 〈H(I1), (Ŝij , P̂ij)j∈Tl , (Aik)k∈{0,...,tl−1}, Vi〉xi
〈I2i〉x0 = 〈H(C), c, T ′, (Ŝji, P̂ji, Hsj(i))j∈T ′
l
〉x0
〈R2i〉xi = 〈H(I2i), ri〉xi
〈I3〉x0 = 〈H(C), r, E〉x0
〈R3i〉xi = 〈H(I3), (Sji, Pji)j∈T ′l 〉xi
P
ha
se
1
P
ha
se
2
P
ha
se
3
1. Initialization
2. Share-Distribution
3. Secret-Commitment
4. Secret-Acknowledgement
5. Decryption-Request
6. Share-Decryption
7. Randomness-Recovery: Z, L
(x0, X0) / (xi, Xi) Private and public key of client / server i
C Session configuration
T Group configuration
u, w Purpose string, time stamp
Ŝij / Sij Encrypted / decrypted share
P̂ij / Pij Encryption / decryption consistency proof
Aik Polynomial commitment
Hsi(j) Share commitment
Vi, c, r, E Schnorr commitment, challenge, response, exceptions
T ′ / T ′l Chosen secrets overall / of group l
Z Collective randomness
L Transcript (protocol log)
Fig. 2. An overview of the RandHound randomness generation process
a) Set the values in C and choose a random integer
rT ∈R Zq as a seed to pseudorandomly create a
balanced grouping T of S. Record C in L.
b) Prepare the message
〈I1〉x0 = 〈H(C), T, u, w〉x0 ,
record it in L, and broadcast it to all servers.
2) Share Distribution (Server). To distribute shares, each
trustee i ∈ Tl executes step 1 of PVSS:
a) Map H(C) to a group element H ∈ G∗, set tl =
b|Tl|/3c + 1, and (randomly) choose a degree tl − 1
secret sharing polynomial si(x). The secret to-be-
shared is Si0 = Gsi(0).
b) Create polynomial commitments Aik, for all k ∈
{0, . . . , tl − 1}, and compute encrypted shares Ŝij =
X
si(j)
j and consistency proofs P̂ij for all j ∈ Tl.
c) Choose vi ∈R Zq and compute Vi = Gvi as a Schnorr
commitment.
d) Prepare the message
〈R1i〉xi = 〈H(I1), (Ŝij , P̂ij)j∈Tl , (Aik)k∈{0,...,tl−1}, Vi〉xi
and send it back to the client.
3) Secret Commitment (Client). The client commits to the
set of shared secrets that contribute to the final random
string, and asks servers to co-sign his choice:
a) Record each received 〈R1i〉xi message in L.
b) Verify all Ŝij against P̂ij using Xi and Aik. Buffer
each (correct) Hsi(j) created in the process. Mark
each share that does not pass the verification as in-
valid, and do not forward the corresponding tuple
(Ŝij , P̂ij , H
si(j)) to the respective trustee.
c) Create the commitment to the final list of secrets T ′ =
(T ′0, . . . , T
′
m−1) by randomly selecting T
′
l ⊂ Tl such
that |T ′l | = tl for all l ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}.
d) Compute the aggregate Schnorr commit V =
∏
i Vi
and the Schnorr challenge c = H(V ‖ H(C) ‖ T ′).
e) Prepare the message
〈I2i〉x0 = 〈H(C), c, T ′, (Ŝji, P̂ji, Hsj(i))j∈T ′l 〉x0 ,
record it in L, and send it to trustee i ∈ Tl.
4) Secret Acknowledgment (Server). Each trustee i ∈ Tl
acknowledges the client’s commitment by executing the
following steps:
a) Check that |T ′l | = tl for each T ′l in T ′ and that f+1 ≤∑m−1
l=0 tl. Abort if any of those conditions does not
hold.
b) Compute the Schnorr response ri = vi − cxi.
c) Prepare the message
〈R2i〉xi = 〈H(I2i), ri〉xi
and send it back to the client.
5) Decryption Request (Client). The client requests the
decryption of the secrets from the trustees by presenting
a valid Schnorr signature on his commitment:
a) Record each received 〈R2i〉xi message in L.
b) Compute the aggregate Schnorr response r =
∑
i ri
and create a list of exceptions E that contains infor-
mation on missing server commits and/or responses.
c) Prepare the message
〈I3〉x0 = 〈H(C), r, E〉x0 ,
record it in L, and broadcast it to all servers.
6) Share Decryption (Server). To decrypt received shares,
each trustee i ∈ Tl performs step 2 of PVSS:
a) Check that (c, r) forms a valid Schnorr signature on
T ′ taking exceptions recorded in E into account and
verify that at least 2f +1 servers signed. Abort if any
of those conditions does not hold.
b) Check for all j ∈ T ′l that Ŝji verifies against P̂ji using
Hsj(i) and public key Xi.
c) If the verification fails, mark Ŝji as invalid and do not
decrypt it. Otherwise, decrypt Ŝji by computing Sji =
(Ŝji)
x−1i = Gsj(i) and create a decryption consistency
proof Pji.
d) Prepare the message
〈R3i〉xi = 〈H(I3), (Sji, Pji)j∈T ′l 〉xi
and send it back to the client.
7) Randomness Recovery (Client). To construct the col-
lective randomness, the client performs step 3 of PVSS:
a) Record all received 〈R3i〉xi messages in L.
b) Check each share Sji against Pji and mark invalid
ones.
c) Use Lagrange interpolation to recover the individual
Si0 that have enough valid shares Sij and abort if even
a single one of the secrets previously committed to in
T ′ cannot be reconstructed.
d) Compute the collective random value as
Z =
∏
i∈⋃T ′l
Si0 ,
and publish Z and L.
2) Randomness Verification: A verifier who wants to check
the validity of the collective randomness Z against the tran-
script
L = (C, 〈I1〉x0 , 〈R1i〉xi , 〈I2i〉x0 , 〈R2i〉xi , 〈I3〉x0 , 〈R3i〉xi)
has to perform the following steps:
1) Verify the values of arguments included in the session
configuration C = (X,T, f, u, w). Specifically, check
that |X| = n = 3f + 1, that groups Tl defined in T are
non-overlapping and balanced, that |X| = ∑m−1l=0 |Tl|,
that each group threshold satisfies tl = |Tl|/3+ 1, that u
and w match the intended use of Z, and that the hash of
C matches H(C) as recorded in the messages.
2) Verify all signatures of 〈I1〉x0 , 〈R1i〉xi , 〈I2i〉x0 , 〈R2i〉xi
〈I3〉x0 , and 〈R3i〉xi . Ignore invalid messages for the rest
of the verification.
3) Verify that H(I1) matches the hash recorded in R1i.
Repeat for I2i and R2i, and I3 and R3i. Ignore messages
that do not include the correct hash.
4) Check that T ′ contains at least f + 1 secrets, that the
collective signature on T ′ is valid and that at least 2f+1
servers contributed to the signature (taking into account
the exceptions in E).
5) Verify each recorded encrypted share Ŝij , whose secret
was chosen in T ′, against the proof P̂ij using Xi and
Aik. Abort if there are not enough shares for any secret
chosen in T ′.
6) Verify each recorded decrypted share Sij against the
proof Pij where the corresponding Ŝij was found to be
valid. Abort if there are not enough shares for any secret
chosen in T ′.
7) Verify Z by recovering Z ′ from the recovered individual
secrets Si0 and by checking that Z = Z ′. If the values
are equal, then the collective randomness Z is valid.
Otherwise, reject Z.
C. Security Properties
RandHound provides the following security properties:
1) Availability. For an honest client, the protocol success-
fully completes and produces the final random output Z
with high probability.
2) Unpredictability. No party learns anything about the final
random output Z, except with negligible probability, until
the secret shares are revealed.
3) Unbiasability. The final random output Z represents an
unbiased, uniformly random value, except with negligible
probability.
4) Verifiability. The collective randomness Z is third-party
verifiable against the transcript L, that serves as an
unforgeable attestation that the documented set of par-
ticipants ran the protocol to produce the one-and-only
random output Z, except with negligible probability.
In the discussion below, we assume that each honest node
follows the protocol and that all cryptographic primitives
RandHound uses provide their intended security properties.
Specifically, the (t, n)-PVSS scheme ensures that a secret can
be recovered only by using a minimum of t shares and that
the shares do not leak information about the secret.
Availability. Our goal is to ensure that an honest client
can successfully complete the protocol, even in the presence
of adversarial servers that misbehave arbitrarily, including by
refusing to participate. A dishonest client can always abort
the protocol, or simply not run it, so we do not consider a
“self-DoS” by the client to be an attack on availability. In the
remaining security properties, we can thus restrict our concern
to attacks in which a dishonest client might corrupt (e.g. bias)
the output without affecting the output’s availability.
According to the protocol specification, an honest client
randomly assigns (honest and dishonest) nodes to their groups.
Therefore, each group’s ratio of honest to dishonest nodes will
closely resemble the overall ratio of honest to dishonest nodes
in the entire set. Given that n = 3f +1, the expected number
of nodes in a group Tl is about 3f/m. The secret-sharing
threshold of tl = |Tl|/3 + 1 = (3f/m)/3 + 1 = f/m + 1
enables 2f/m honest nodes in each group to recover its
group secret without the collaboration of malicious nodes. This
ensures availability, with high probability, when the client is
honest. Section V-C analyzes of the failure probability of a
RandHound run for different parameter configurations.
Unpredictability. We want to ensure that output Z remains
unknown to the adversary until step 7 of the protocol, when
honest nodes decrypt and reveal the secret shares they hold.
The random output Z is a function of m group secrets,
where each group contributes exactly one secret that depends
on tl inputs from group members. Further, each input is
recoverable using PVSS with tl shares. In order to achieve
unpredictability, there must be at least one group secret that
remains unknown to the adversary until step 7.
We will show that there exists at least one group for
which the adversary cannot prematurely recover the group’s
secret. An adversary who controls the dishonest client can
deviate from the protocol description and arbitrarily assign
nodes to groups. Assuming that there are h honest nodes
in total and m groups, then by the generalized pigeonhole
principle, regardless of how the dishonest client assigns the
groups, there will be at least one group which contains at
least dh/me nodes. In other words, there must be at least
one group with at least an average number of honest nodes.
Therefore, we set the threshold for secret recovery for each
group l such that the number of nodes needed to recover
the group secret contains at least one honest node, that is,
|Tl|−h/m+1 = f/m+1. In RandHound, we have n = 3f+1
and tl = |Tl|/3 + 1 = (3f/m)/3 + 1 = f/m+ 1 as needed.
Consequently, the adversary will control at most m − 1
groups and obtain at most m− 1 group secrets. Based on the
properties of PVSS, and the fact that Z is a function of all m
group secrets, the adversary cannot reconstruct Z without the
shares held by honest nodes that are only revealed in step 7.
Unbiasability. We want to ensure that an adversary cannot
influence the value of the random output Z.
In order to prevent the adversary from controlling the output
Z, we need to ensure that there exists at least one group for
which the adversary does not control the group’s secret. If,
for each group, the adversary can prematurely recover honest
nodes’ inputs to the group secret and therefore be able to
prematurely recover all groups’ secrets, then the adversary can
try many different valid subsets of the groups’ commits to
find the one that produces the Z most beneficial to him. If,
for each group, the adversary can exclude honest nodes from
contributing inputs to the group secret, then the adversary has
full control over all group secrets, hence Z.
As argued in the discussion of unpredictability, there exists
at least one group for which the adversary does not control
its group secret. Furthermore, the requirement that the client
has to select tl inputs from each group in his commitment T ′
ensures that at least
∑m−1
l=0 tl =
∑m−1
l=0 f/m + 1 = f + m
inputs contribute to the group secrets, and consequently to the
output Z. Combining these two arguments, we know that there
is at least one group that is not controlled by the adversary
and at least one honest input from that group contributes to Z.
As a result, the honest member’s input randomizes the group’s
secret and Z, regardless of the adversary’s actions.
Lastly, the condition that at least 2f + 1 servers must sign
off on the client’s commitment T ′ ensures that a malicious
client cannot arrange malicious nodes in such a way that would
enable him to mount a view-splitting attack. Without that last
condition the adversary could use different arrangements of
honest and dishonest inputs that contribute to Z and generate
multiple collective random values with valid transcripts from
which he could choose and release his preferred one.
Verifiability. In RandHound, only the client obtains the
final random output Z. In order for Z to be usable in other
contexts and by other parties, any third party must be able to
independently verify that Z was properly generated. Therefore,
the output of RandHound consists of Z and a transcript
L, which serves as third-party verifiable proof of Z. The
transcript L must (a) enable the third party to replay the
protocol execution, and (b) be unforgeable.
L contains all messages sent and received during the pro-
tocol execution, as well as the session configuration C. If the
verifying party finds C acceptable, specifically the identities of
participating servers, he can replay the protocol execution and
verify the behavior of the client and the servers, as outlined
in Section III-B2. After a successful protocol run completes,
the only relevant protocol inputs that remain secret are the
private keys of the client and the servers. Therefore, any third
party on its own can verify L and decide on its validity since
the private keys are only used to produce signatures and the
signatures are verified using the public keys.
If an adversary can forge the transcript, producing a valid
transcript without an actual run of the protocol, then the
adversary must be in possession of the secret keys of all
participant listed in C, violating the assumption that at most
f nodes are controlled by the adversary.
Therefore, under the assumption that all cryptographic prim-
itives used in RandHound offer their intended security proper-
ties, it is infeasible for any party to produce a valid transcript,
except by legitimately running the protocol to completion with
the willing participation of the at least
∑m−1
l=0 |T ′l | servers
listed in the client’s commitment vector T ′ (step 3).
Further Considerations. In each protocol run, the group
element H is derived from the session identifier H(C), which
mitigates replay attacks. A malicious server that tries to replay
an old message is immediately detected by the client, as the
replayed PVSS proofs will not verify against the new H .
It is also crucial for RandHound’s security that none of the
participants knows a logarithm a with G = Ha. Otherwise
the participant can prematurely recover secret shares since
(Hsi(j))a = Hasi(j) = Gsi(j) = Sij , which violates Rand-
Hound’s unpredictability property and might even enable a
malicious node to bias the output. This has to be taken into
account when deriving H from H(C). The naive way to map
H(C) to a scalar a and then set H = Ga is obviously insecure
as G = H1/a. The Elligator mappings [7] provide a secure
option for elliptic curves.
D. Extensions
Each Lagrange interpolation that the client has to perform to
recover a server’s secret can be replaced by the evaluation of
a hash function as follows: Each server i sends, alongside his
encrypted shares, the value H(si(0)) as a commitment to the
client in step 2. After the client’s request to decrypt the shares,
each server, whose secret was chosen in T ′, replies directly
with si(0). The client checks the received value against the
server’s commitment and, if valid, integrates it into Z.
Note that the verification of the commitment is necessary,
as a malicious server could otherwise just send an arbitrary
value as his secret that would be integrated into the collective
randomness thereby making it unverifiable against the tran-
script L. The client can still recover the secret as usual from
the decrypted shares with Lagrange interpolation if the above
check fails or if the respective server is unavailable.
Finally, SCRAPE [16] provides a new approach to decen-
tralized randomness that builds upon an improved version of
PVSS. While this approach is orthogonal to ours, the improved
PVSS scheme has a lower verification complexity and can be
used to reduce the complexity of RandHound from O(c2n) to
O(cn), making it more scalable.
IV. RANDHERD: A SCALABLE RANDOMNESS COTHORITY
This section introduces RandHerd, a protocol that builds
a collective authority or cothority [58] to produce unbiasable
and verifiable randomness. RandHerd serves as a decentralized
randomness beacon [45], [49], efficiently generating a regular
stream of random outputs. RandHerd builds on RandHound,
but requires no distinguished client to initiate it, and signifi-
cantly improves repeat-execution performance.
We first outline RandHerd, then detail the protocol, analyze
its security properties, and explore protocol extensions.
A. Overview
RandHerd provides a continually-running decentralized ser-
vice that can generate publicly verifiable and unbiasable ran-
domness on demand, at regular intervals, or both. RandHerd’s
goal is to reduce communication and computational over-
head of the randomness generation further from RandHound’s
O(c2n) to O(c2 log n) given a group size c. To achieve this,
RandHerd requires a one-time setup phase that securely shards
cothority nodes into subgroups, then leverages aggregation and
communication trees to generate subsequent random outputs.
As before, the random output r̂ of RandHerd is unbiasable and
can be verified, together with the corresponding challenge ĉ,
as a collective Schnorr signature against RandHerd’s collective
public key. Fig. 3 illustrates RandHerd’s design.
RandHerd’s design builds on RandHound, CoSi [58], and
a (t, n)-threshold Schnorr signature (TSS) scheme [57] that
implements threshold-based witness cosigning (TSS-CoSi).
A cothority configuration C defines a given RandHerd
instance, listing the public keys of participating servers and
their collective public key X . The RandHerd protocol con-
sists of RandHerd-Setup, which performs one-time setup, and
RandHerd-Round, which produces successive random outputs.
The setup protocol uses RandHound to select a RandHerd
leader at random and arrange nodes into verifiably unbiased
random groups. Each group runs the key generation phase
of TSS to establish a public group key X̂l, such that each
group member holds a share of the corresponding private
key x̂l. Each group can issue a collective signature with a
cooperation of tl of nodes. All public group keys contribute
to the collective RandHerd public key X̂ , which is endorsed
by individual servers in a run of CoSi.
Once operational, to produce each random output, Rand-
Herd generates a collective Schnorr signature (ĉ, r̂) on some
input w using TSS-CoSi and outputs r̂ as randomness. TSS-
CoSi modifies CoSi to use threshold secret sharing (TSS)
rather than CoSi’s usual exception mechanism to handle node
failures, as required to ensure bias-resistance despite node
failures. All m RandHerd groups contribute to each output, but
each group’s contribution requires the participation of only tl
members. Using TSS-CoSi to generate and collectively certify
random outputs allows clients to verify any RandHerd output
via a simple Schnorr signature check against public key X̂ .
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Fig. 3. An overview on the RandHerd design
B. Description
Let N = {0, . . . , n− 1} denote the list of all nodes, and let
f denote the maximum number of permitted Byzantine nodes.
We assume that n = 3f + 1. The private and public key of a
node i ∈ N is xi and Xi = Gxi , respectively. Let C denote the
cothority configuration file listing the public keys of all nodes,
the cothority’s collective public key X̂ =
∏n−1
j=0 X̂j , contact
information such as IP address and port number, default group
sizes for secret sharing, and a timestamp on when C was
created. Each node has a copy of C.
1) RandHerd-Setup: The setup phase of RandHerd consists
of the following four steps:
1) Leader Election. When RandHerd starts, each node gen-
erates a lottery ticket ti = H(C ‖ Xi) for every i ∈ N and
sorts them in an ascending order. The ticket ti with the
lowest value wins the lottery and the corresponding node i
becomes the tentative RandHerd leader. If this leader is or
becomes unavailable, leadership passes to the next node
in ascending order. A standard view-change protocol [39],
[17] manages the transition between successive leaders.
In summary, any server who is dissatisfied with the cur-
rent leader’s progress broadcasts a view-change message
for the next leader. Such messages from at least f + 1
nodes force a view change, and the new leader begins
operation upon receiving at least 2f + 1 such “votes of
confidence.” Section IV-E1 discusses an improvement to
leader election to make successive leaders unpredictable.
2) Seed Generation. The leader assumes the role of the
RandHound client and runs the protocol, with all other
nodes acting as RandHound servers. Each leader has only
one chance to complete this step. If he fails, the next
node, as determined by the above lottery, steps in and
attempts to execute RandHound. After a successful run
of RandHound, the leader obtains the tuple (Z,L), where
Z is a collective random string and L is the publicly
verifiable transcript that proves the validity of Z. Lastly,
the current leader broadcasts (Z,L) to all nodes.
3) Group Setup. Once the nodes receive (Z,L), they use
L to verify Z, and then use Z as a seed to compute
a random permutation of N resulting in N′. Afterwards
N′ is sharded into m groups Tl of the same size as in
RandHound, for l ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}. The node at index
0 of each group becomes the group leader and the group
leader of the first group takes up the role of the temporary
RandHerd leader. If any of the leaders is unavailable, the
next one, as specified by the order in N′, steps in. After
this step, all nodes know their group assignments and the
respective group leaders run a TSS-setup to establish the
long-term group secret x̂l using a secret sharing threshold
of tl = |Tl|/3 + 1. All group leaders report back to the
current RandHerd leader with the public group key X̂l.
4) Key Certification. As soon as the RandHerd leader has
received all X̂j , he combines them to get the collective
RandHerd public key X̂ =
∏m−1
j=0 X̂j and starts a run of
the CoSi protocol to certify X̂ by requesting a signature
from each individual node. Therefore, the leader sends
X̂ together with all X̂j and each individual node checks
that X̂j corresponds to its public group key and that X̂
is well-formed. Only if both checks succeed, the node
participates in the co-signing request, otherwise it refuses.
The collective signature on X̂ is valid if there are least
f/m+1 signatures from each group and the total number
of individual signatures across the groups is at least
2f + 1. Once a valid signature on X̂ is established, the
setup of RandHerd is completed. The validity of X̂ can
be verified by anyone by using the collective public key
X , as specified in the configuration C.
After a successful setup, RandHerd switches to the op-
erational randomness generation mode. Below we describe
how the protocol works with an honest and available leader.
A dishonest or failed leader can halt progress at any time,
but RandHerd-Round uses a view-change protocol as in
RandHerd-Setup to recover from leader failures.
2) RandHerd-Round: In this mode, we distinguish between
communications from the RandHerd leader to group leaders,
from group leaders to individual nodes, and communications
between all nodes within their respective group. Each random-
ness generation run consists of the following seven steps and
can be executed periodically:
1) Initialization (Leader). The RandHerd leader initializes
a protocol run by broadcasting an announcement message
containing a timestamp w to all group leaders. All groups
will cooperate to produce a signature (ĉ, r̂) on w.
2) Group Secret Setup / Commitment (Groups / Servers).
Upon the receipt of the announcement, each group creates
a short-term secret v̂l, using a secret sharing threshold
tl, to produce a group commitment V̂l = Gv̂l that will
be used towards a signature of w. Furthermore, each
individual node randomly chooses vi ∈R Zq , creates
a commitment Vi = Gvi that will be used to globally
witness, hence validate the round challenge ĉ, and sends
it to the group leader. The group leader aggregates the
received individual commitments into V˜l =
∏
i∈Tl Vi and
sends (V̂l, V˜l) back to the RandHerd leader.
3) Challenge (Leader). The RandHerd leader aggregates
the respective commitments into V̂ =
∏m−1
l=0 V̂l and
V˜ =
∏m−1
l=0 V˜l, and creates two challenges ĉ = H(V̂ ‖ w)
and c˜ = H(V˜ ‖ V̂ ). Afterwards, the leader sends (ĉ, c˜)
to all group leaders that in turn re-broadcast them to the
individual servers of their group.
4) Response (Servers). Server i stores the round group
challenge ĉ for later usage, creates its individual response
ri = vi− c˜xi, and sends it back to the group leader. The
latter aggregates all responses into r˜l =
∑
i∈Tl ri and
creates an exception list E˜l of servers in his group that
did not respond or sent bad responses. Finally, each group
leader sends (r˜l, E˜l) to the RandHerd leader.
5) Secret Recovery Request (Leader). The RandHerd
leader gathers all exceptions E˜l into a list E˜, and ag-
gregates the responses into r˜ =
∑m−1
l=0 r˜l taking E˜ into
account. If at least 2f + 1 servers contributed to r˜, the
RandHerd leader sends the global group commitment V̂
and the signature (c˜, r˜, E˜) to all group leaders thereby
requesting the recovery of the group secrets.
6) Group Secret Recovery (Groups / Servers). The group
leaders re-broadcast the received message. Each group
member individually checks that (c˜, r˜, E˜) is a valid
signature on V̂ and only if it is the case and at least 2f+1
individual servers signed off, they start reconstructing the
short-term secret v̂l. The group leader creates the group
response r̂l = v̂l − ĉx̂l and sends it to the RandHerd
leader.
7) Randomness Recovery (Leader). The RandHerd leader
aggregates all responses r̂ =
∑m−1
l=0 r̂l and, only if he
received a reply from all groups, he releases (ĉ, r̂) as the
collective randomness of RandHerd.
3) Randomness Verification: The collective randomness
(ĉ, r̂) of RandHerd is a collective Schnorr signature on the
timestamp w, which is efficiently verifiable against the aggre-
gate group key X̂ .
C. Security Properties
RandHerd provides the following security properties:
1) Availability. Given an honest leader, the protocol success-
fully completes and produces the final random output Z
with high probability.
2) Unpredictability. No party learns anything about the final
random output Z, except with negligible probability, until
the group responses are revealed.
3) Unbiasability. The final random output Z represents an
unbiased, uniformly random value, except with negligible
probability.
4) Verifiability. The collective randomness Z is third-party
verifiable as a collective Schnorr signature under X̂ .
We make the same assumptions as in the case of Rand-
Hound (Section III-C) on the behavior of the honest nodes
and the cryptographic primitives RandHerd employs.
RandHerd uses a simple and predictable ahead-of-time elec-
tion mechanism to choose the temporary RandHerd leader in
the setup phase. This approach is sufficient because the group
assignments and the RandHerd leader for the randomness
phase of the protocol are chosen based on the output of
RandHound. RandHound’s properties of unbiasability and un-
predictability hold for honest and dishonest clients. Therefore,
the resulting group setup has the same properties in both cases.
Availability. Our goal is to ensure that with high probability
the protocol successfully completes, even in the presence of
an active adversary.
As discussed above, the use of RandHound in the setup
phase ensures that all groups are randomly assigned. If the
RandHerd leader makes satisfactory progress, the secret shar-
ing threshold tl = f/m+1 enables 2f/m honest nodes in each
group to reconstruct the short-term secret v̂l, hence produce
the group response r̂l without requiring the collaboration of
malicious nodes. An honest leader will make satisfactory
progress and eventually output r̂ at the end of step 7. This
setup corresponds to a run of RandHound by an honest
client. Therefore, the analysis of the failure probability of
a RandHound run described in Section V-C is applicable to
RandHerd in the honest leader scenario.
In RandHerd, however, with a probability f/n, a dishonest
client will be selected as the RandHerd leader. Although the
choice of a dishonest leader does not affect the group assign-
ments, he might arbitrarily decide to stop making progress
at any point of the protocol. We need to ensure RandHerd’s
availability over time, and if the current leader stops making
adequate progress, we move to the next leader indicated by
the random output of RandHound and, as with common BFT
protocols, we rely on “view change” [17], [39] to continue
operations.
Unpredictability. We want to ensure that the random output
of RandHerd remains unknown until the group responses r̂l
are revealed in step 6.
The high-level design of RandHerd closely resembles that
of RandHound. Both protocols use the same thresholds, assign
n nodes into m groups, and each group contributes an exactly
one secret towards the final random output of the protocol.
Therefore, as in RandHound, there will similarly be at least
one RandHerd group with at least an average number of honest
nodes. Furthermore, the secret-sharing and required group
inputs threshold of tl = f + 1 guarantees that for at least
one group, the adversary cannot prematurely recover v̂l and
reconstruct the group’s response r̂l. Therefore, before step 6,
the adversary will control at most m− 1 groups and obtain at
most m− 1 out of m responses that contribute to r̂.
Unbiasability. Our goal is to prevent the adversary from
biasing the value of the random output r̂.
As in RandHound, we know that for at least one group the
adversary cannot prematurely recover r̂l and that r̂l contains a
contribution from at least one honest group member. Further,
the requirement that the leader must obtain a sign-off from
2f +1 individual nodes in step 4 on his commitment V̂ , fixes
the output value r̂ before any group secrets r̂l are produced.
This effectively commits the leader to a single output r̂.
The main difference between RandHound and RandHerd is
the fact that an adversary who controls the leader can affect
unbiasability by withholding the protocol output r̂ in step 7,
if r̂ is not beneficial to him. A failure of a leader would force
a view change and therefore a new run of RandHerd, giving
the adversary at least one alternative value of r̂, if the next
selected leader is honest, or several tries if multiple successive
leaders are dishonest or the adversary can successfully DoS
them. The adversary cannot freely choose the next value of
r̂, nor go back to the previous value if the next one is not
preferable, the fact that he can sacrifice a leadership role
to try for an alternate outcome constitutes bias. This bias is
limited, as the view-change schedule must eventually appoint
an honest leader, at which point the adversary has no further
bias opportunity. Section IV-D further addresses this issue
with an improvement ensuring that an adversary can hope
to hold leadership for at most O(log n) such events before
permanently losing leadership and hence bias opportunity.
Verifiability. The random output r̂ generated in RandHerd
is obtained from a TSS-CoSi Schnorr signature (ĉ, r̂) on input
w against a public key X̂ . Any third-party can verify r̂ by
simply checking the validity of (ĉ, r̂) as a standard Schnorr
signature on input w using X̂ .
D. Addressing Leader Availability Issues
Each run of RandHerd is coordinated by a RandHerd leader
who is responsible for ensuring a satisfactory progress of the
protocol. Although a (honest or dishonest) leader might fail
and cause the protocol failure, we are specifically concerned
with intentional failures that benefit the adversary and enable
him to affect the protocol’s output.
As discussed above, once a dishonest RandHerd leader
receives responses from group leaders in step 7, he is the first
one to know r̂ and can act accordingly, including failing the
protocol. However, the failure of the RandHerd leader does
not necessarily have to cause the failure of the protocol. Even
without the dishonest leader’s participation, f/m+1 of honest
nodes in each group are capable of recovering the protocol
output. They need, however, a consistent view of the protocol
and the output value that was committed to.
Instead of requiring a CoSi round to get 2f+1 signatures on
V̂ , we use a Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocol to reach
consensus on V̂ and consequently on the global challenge ĉ =
H(V̂ ‖ w). Upon a successful completion of BFT, at least
f +1 honest nodes have witnessed that we have consensus on
the V̂ . Consequently, the ĉ that is required to produce each
group’s response r̂l = v̂l − ĉx̂l is “set in stone” at this point.
If a leader fails, instead of restarting RandHerd, we can select
a new leader, whose only allowed action is to continue the
protocol from the existing commitment. This design removes
the opportunity for a dishonest leader biasing the output even
a few times before losing leadership.
Using a traditional BFT protocol (e.g., PBFT [17]) would
yield poor scalability for RandHerd because of the large num-
ber of servers that participate in the protcol. To overcome this
challenge, we use BFT-CoSi from ByzCoin [39], a Byzantine
consensus protocol that uses scalable collective signing, to
agree on successfully delivering the commitment V̂ . Due to
the BFT guarantees RandHerd crosses the point-of-no return
when consensus is reached. Even if the dishonest leader, tries
to bias output by failing the protocol, the new (eventually
honest) leader will be able to recover r̂, allowing all honest
servers to successfully complete the protocol.
The downside of this BFT-commitment approach is that
once consensus is reached and the point-of-no return is
crossed, then in the rare event that an adversary controls two-
thirds of any group, the attacker can halt the protocol forever
by preventing honest nodes from recovering the committed
secret. This risk may necessitate a more conservative choice
of group size, such that the chance of an adversary ever con-
trolling any group is not merely unlikely but truly negligible.
E. Extensions
1) Randomizing Temporary-Leader Election: The current
set-up phase of RandHerd uses a simple leader election
mechanism. Because the ticket generation uses only values
known to all nodes, it is efficient as it does not require any
communication between the nodes but makes the outcome of
the election predicable as soon as the cothority configuration
file C is available. We use this mechanism to elect a temporary
RandHerd leader whose only responsibility is to run and
provide the output of RandHound to other servers. Rand-
Hound’s unbiasibility property prevents the dishonest leader
from biasing its output. However, an adversary can force f
restarts of RandHound and can therefore delay the setup by
compromising the first (or next) f successive leaders in a well-
known schedule.
To address this issue, we can use a lottery mechanism that
depends on verifiable random functions (VRFs) [43], which
ensures that each participant obtains an unpredictable “fair-
share” chance of getting to be the leader in each round. Each
node produces its lottery ticket as ti = H(C ‖ j)xi , where
C is the group configuration, j is a round number, and xi
is node i’s secret key, along with a NIZK consistency proof
showing that ti is well-formed. Since an adversary has at least
a constant and unpredictable chance of losing the leadership
to some honest node in each lottery, this refinement ensures
with high probability that an adversary can induce at most
O(log n) successive view changes before losing leadership.
2) BLS Signatures: Through the use of CoSi and TSS,
RandHerd utilizes collective Schnorr signatures in a threshold
setting. Other alternatives are possible. Specifically, Boneh-
Lynn-Shacham (BLS) [12] signatures require pairing-based
curves, but offer even shorter signatures (a single elliptic curve
point) and a simpler signing protocol. In the simplified design
using BLS signatures, there is no need to form a fresh Schnorr
commitment collectively, and the process does not need to
be coordinated by a group leader. Instead, a member of each
subgroup, whenever it has decided that the next round has
arrived, produces and releases its share for a BLS signature
of the message for the appropriate time (based on a hash
of view information and the wall-clock time or sequence
number). Each member of a given subgroup waits until a
threshold number of BLS signature shares are available for that
subgroup, and then forms the BLS signature for this subgroup.
The first member to do so can then simply announce or gossip
it with members of other subgroups, combining subgroup
signatures until a global BLS signature is available (based on
a simple combination of the signatures of all subgroups). This
activity can be unstructured and leaderless, since no “arbitrary
choices” need to be made per-transaction: the output of each
time-step is completely deterministic but cryptographically
random and unpredictable before the designated time.
V. EVALUATION
This section experimentally evaluates of our prototype im-
plementations of RandHound and RandHerd. The primary
questions we wish to evaluate are whether architectures of
the two protocols are practical and scalable to large numbers,
e.g., hundreds or thousands of servers, in realistic scenarios.
Important secondary questions are what the important costs
are, such as randomness generation latencies and computation
costs. We start with some details on the implementation itself,
followed by our experimental results, and finally describe our
analysis of the failure probability for both protocols.
A. Implementation
We implemented PVSS, TSS, RandHound, and RandHerd in
Go [33] and made these implementations available on GitHub
as part of the EPFL DEDIS lab’s Cothority framework.2 We
reused existing cothority framework code for CoSi and net-
work communication, and built on the DEDIS advanced crypto
library3 for cryptographic operations such as Shamir secret
sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and optimized arithmetic on
the popular Curve25519 elliptic curve [5]. As a rough indicator
of implementation complexity, Table I shows approximate
lines of code (LoC) of the new modules. Line counts were
measured with GoLoC.4
TABLE I
LINES OF CODE PER MODULE
PVSS TSS RandHound RandHerd
300 700 1300 1000
B. Performance Measurements
1) Experimental Setup: We ran all our experiments on
DeterLab5 using 32 physical machines, each equipped with
an Intel Xeon E5-2650 v4 (24 cores at 2.2GHz), 64GBytes
2https://github.com/dedis/cothority
3https://github.com/dedis/crypto
4https://github.com/gengo/goloc
5http://isi.deterlab.net/
of RAM, and a 10Gbps network link. To simulate a globally-
distributed deployment realistically, we restricted the band-
width of all intern-node connections to 100Mbps and imposed
200ms round-trip latencies on all communication links.
To scale our experiments up to 1024 participants given
limited physical resources, we oversubscribed the DeterLab
servers by up to a factor of 32, arranging the nodes such that
most messages had to go through the network. To test the
influence of oversubscription on our experiments, we reran
the same simulations with 16 servers only. This resulted
in an overhead increase of about 20%, indicating that our
experiments are already CPU-bound and not network-bound
at this scale. We therefore consider these simulation results to
be pessimistic: real-world deployments on servers that are not
oversubscribed in this way may yield better performance.
2) RandHound: Fig. 4 shows the CPU-usage costs of a
complete RandHound run that generates a random value from
N servers. We measured the total costs across all servers,
plus the costs of the client that coordinates RandHound and
generates the Transcript. With 1024 nodes divided into groups
of 32 nodes, for example, the complete RandHound run to
generate randomness requires less than 10 CPU minutes total,
correspond to a cost of about $0.02 on Amazon EC2. This cost
breaks down to about 0.3 CPU seconds per server, representing
negligible per-transaction costs to the servers. The client that
initiates RandHound spends about 3 CPU minutes, costing
less than $0.01 on Amazon EC2. These results suggest that
RandHound is quite economical on today’s hardware.
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Fig. 4. Overall CPU cost of a RandHound protocol run
Fig. 5 shows the wall clock time of a complete RandHound
run for different configurations. This test measures total time
elapsed from when the client initiates RandHound until the
client has computed and verified the random output. Our mea-
surements show that the wall clock time used by the servers to
process client messages is negligible in comparison, and hence
not depicted in Fig. 5. In the 1024-node configuration with
groups of 32 nodes, randomness generation and verification
take roughly 290 and 160 seconds, respectively.
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Fig. 5. Total wall clock time of a RandHound protocol run
3) RandHerd: The RandHerd protocol requires a setup
phase, which uses RandHound to form random groups and
CoSi to sign the RandHerd collective key. The measured CPU
usage of RandHerd setup is depicted in Fig. 6. For 1024 nodes
and a group size of 32, RandHerd setup requires roughly 40
CPU-hours total (2.3 CPU-minutes per node), corresponding
to a cost of $4.00 total on Amazon EC2 (0.3 cents per
participant). The associated wall clock time we measured, not
depicted in the graphs, amounts to about 10 minutes.
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After this setup, RandHerd produces random numbers much
more efficiently. Fig. 7 illustrates measured wall clock time for
a single RandHerd round to generate a 32-byte random value.
With 1024 nodes in groups of 32, RandHerd takes about 6
seconds per round. The corresponding CPU usage across the
entire system, not shown in the graphs, amounts to roughly
30 seconds total (or about 29 CPU-milliseconds per node).
A clear sign of the server-oversubscription with regard to
the network-traffic can be seen in Fig. 7, where the wall clock
time for 1024 nodes and a group size of 32 is lower than the
one for a group size of 24. This is due to the fact that nodes
running on the same server do not have any network-delay. We
did a verification run without server oversubscription for up to
512 nodes and could verify that the wall clock time increases
with higher group-size.
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Fig. 7. Wall clock time per randomness creation round in RandHerd
Fig. 8 compares communication bandwidth costs for CoSi,
RandHound, and RandHerd, with varying number of partici-
pants and a fixed group size of 32 nodes. The straight lines
depict total costs, while the dashed lines depict average cost
per participating server. For the case of 1024 nodes, CoSi and
RandHound require about 15 and 25 MB, respectively. After
the initial setup, one round of RandHerd among 1024 nodes
requires about 400 MB (excluding any setup costs) due to
the higher in-group communication. These values correspond
to the sum of the communication costs of the entire system
and, considering the number of servers involved, are still fairly
moderate. This can be also seen as the average per server cost
is less than 300 KB for RandHerd and around 20 KB for CoSi
and RandHound.
Finally, Fig. 9 compares RandHerd, configured to use only
one group, against a non-scalable baseline protocol similar to
RandShare. Because RandShare performs PVSS secret sharing
among all n nodes, it has computation and communication
complexity of O(n3) per node. In comparison, RandHerd has
sublinear per-round complexity of O(log n) when group size
is constant.
C. Availability Failure Analysis
An adversary who controls too many nodes in any group
can compromise the availability of both RandHound and
RandHerd. We can analyze the probability of availability
failure assuming that nodes are assigned randomly to groups,
which is the case in RandHound when the client assigns groups
honestly, and is always the case in RandHerd. As discussed
in Section III-C, dishonest grouping in RandHound amounts
to self-DoS by the client and is thus outside the threat model.
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To get an upper bound for the failure probability of the
entire system, we first bound the failure probability of a
single group, that can be modeled as a random variable X
that follows the hypergeometric distribution, followed by the
application of Boole’s inequality, also known as the union
bound. For a single group we start with Chva´tal’s formula [55]
P [X ≥ E[X] + cd] ≤ e−2cd2
where d ≥ 0 is a constant and c is the number of draws or in
our case the group size. The event of having a disproportionate
number of malicious nodes in a given group is modeled by
X ≥ c− t+1, where t is the secret sharing threshold. In our
case we use t = cp + 1 since E[X] = cp, where p ≤ 0.33
is the adversaries’ power. Plugging everything into Chva´tal’s
formula and doing some simplifications, we obtain
P [X ≥ c(1− p)] ≤ e−2c(1−2p)2
Applying the union bound on this result, we obtain Figs. 10
and 11, which show average system failure probabilities q for
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varying group sizes (c = 16, . . . , 64) and varying adversarial
power (p = 0.01, . . . , 0.33), respectively. Note that q on the y-
axis is plotted in “security parameter” form as − log2(q): thus,
higher points in the graph indicate exponentially lower failure
probability. Finally, Table II lists failure probabilities for some
concrete configurations. There we see, for example, that both
RandHound and RandHerd have a failure probability of at
most 2−10.25 ≈ 0.08% for p = 0.33 and c = 32. Moreover,
assuming p = 0.33, we identified the point where the system’s
failure probability falls below 1% for a group size of c = 21.
TABLE II
SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITIES q (GIVEN AS − log2(q)) FOR CONCRETE
CONFIGURATIONS OF ADVERSARIAL POWER p AND GROUP SIZE c
p | c 16 24 32 40
0.23 13.13 19.69 26.26 32.82
0.28 8.66 15.17 17.33 21.67
0.32 5.76 8.64 11.52 14.40
0.33 5.12 7.69 10.25 12.82
VI. RELATED WORK
Generation of public randomness has been studied in various
contexts. In 1981, Blum proposed the first coin flipping proto-
col [10]. Rabin introduced the notion of cryptographic random-
ness beacons in 1983 [49]. NIST later launched such a bea-
con to generate randomness from high-entropy sources [45].
Centralized randomness servers have seen limited adoption,
however, in part because users must rely on the trustworthiness
of the party that runs the service.
Other approaches attempt to avoid trusted parties [48], [13],
[2], [21]. Bonneau et al. [13] use Bitcoin to collect entropy,
focusing on analyzing the financial cost of a given amount
of bias rather than preventing bias outright. Lenstra et al. [40]
propose a new cryptographic primitive, a slow hash, to prevent
a client from biasing the output. This approach is promising
but relies on new and untested cryptographic hardness assump-
tions, and assumes that everyone observes the commitment
before the slow hash produces its output. If an adversary can
delay the commitment messages and/or accelerate the slow
hash sufficiently, he can see the hash function’s output before
committing, leaving the difficult question of how slow is “slow
enough” in practice. Other approached use lotteries [2], or
financial data [21] as public randomness sources.
An important observation by Gennaro et al. [29] is that
in many distributed key generation protocols [47] an attacker
can observe public values of honest participants. To mitigate
this attack, the authors propose to delay the disclosure of the
protocol’s public values after a “point-of-no-return” at which
point the attacker cannot influence the output anymore. We
also use the concept of a “point-of-no-return” to prevent an
adversary from biasing the output. However, their assumption
of a fully synchronous network is unrealistic for real-world
scenarios. Cachin et al., propose an asychronous distributed
coin tossing scheme for public randomness generation [15],
which relies on a trusted setup dealer.
We improve on that by letting multiple nodes deal secrets
and combine them for randomness generation in our pro-
tocols. Finally, Kate et al. [38], introduced an approach to
solve distributed key-generation in large-scale asynchronous
networks, such as the Internet. The communication complexity
of their solution, similar to Gennaro’s and Cachin’s prevents
scalability to large numbers of nodes. Our protocols use
sharding to limit communication overheads to linear increases,
which enables RandHound and RandHerd to scale to hundreds
of nodes.
Applications of public randomness are manifold and include
the protection of hidden services in the Tor network [34],
selection of elliptic curve parameters [2], [40], Byzantine
consensus [46], electronic voting [1], random sharding of
nodes into groups [35], and non-interactive client-puzzles [37].
In all of these cases, both RandHound and RandHerd may
be useful for generating bias-resistant, third-party verifiable
randomness. For example, RandHound could be integrated into
the Tor consensus mechanism to help the directory authorities
generate their daily random values in order to protect hidden
services against DoS or popularity estimation attacks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Although many distributed protocols critically depend on
public bias-resistant randomness for security, current solutions
that are secure against active adversaries only work for small
(n ≈ 10) numbers of participants [15], [38]. In this paper,
we have focused on the important issue of scalability and ad-
dressed this challenge by adapting well-known cryptographic
primitives. We have proposed two different approaches to
generating public randomness in a secure manner in the
presence of a Byzantine adversary. RandHound uses PVSS
and depends on the pigeonhole principle for output integrity.
RandHerd relies on RandHound for secure setup and then uses
TSS and CoSi to produce random output as a Schnorr signature
verifiable under a collective RandHerd key. RandHound and
RandHerd provide unbiasability, unpredictability, availability
and third-party verifiability while retaining good performance
and low failure probabilities. Our working prototype demon-
strates that both protocols, in principle, can scale even to
thousands of participants. By carefully choosing protocols
parameters, however, we achieve a balance of performance,
security, and availability. While retaining a failure probability
of at most 0.08% against a Byzantine adversary, a set of 512
nodes divided into groups of 32 can produce fresh random
output every 240 seconds in RandHound, and every 6 seconds
in RandHerd after an initial setup.
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